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| October 2019 |
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Following publication of revised Guidance Note 10 (GN10) *Business Continuity and Disaster Recovery[[1]](#footnote-1)* participants of ASX Clear, ASX Clear (Futures), ASX Settlement and Austraclear (as applicable) are expected to comply with all changes, other than changes to the RTO,[[2]](#footnote-2) within 6 months, i.e. by February 2020. Participants may be required by ASX to provide evidence of how they are complying with GN10 upon request.

To assist participants in carrying out their assessments and/or evidencing their compliance, ASX has created the self‑assessment form below. (Participants are not obliged to use this self‑assessment and may design a form tailored to their own business and processes). This form covers key requirements that are applicable to ASX Clear, ASX Clear (Futures) and ASX Settlement. Participants with multiple ASX participations may complete a single form for all participations or separate forms as they deem appropriate.

This self-assessment form will assist participants to:

* document the assessment of their current business continuity and disaster recovery arrangements against the key requirements of GN10;
* identify requirements that are partially aligned or not aligned;
* record the remediation action taken to align to the requirements; and
* evidence the results of the gap analysis and the independent review process.

### **Instructions for completion:**

In using this self‑assessment the participant should:

* select a rating of ‘Fully aligned’, ‘Partially aligned’ or ‘Not aligned’ that accurately reflects its current level of alignment to the relevant requirement; and
* where a rating of ‘Partially aligned’ or ‘Not aligned’ is selected, include details to specify which aspect of the requirement is not fully aligned, and provide details of remediation action taken/planned to align to the arrangements, including targeted completion date (where applicable).

Participants are not required to provide the completed self‑assessment form to ASX upon completion. However, participants should be aware that ASX may, at any time, request a copy of their self‑assessment (including any supporting information used for the purposes of assessing the participant’s level of alignment and remediation actions planned to meet the requirements). If participants do not use this form, they must provide similar evidence to ASX’s satisfaction on request.

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| **Abbreviations used** |  |
| BC | Business Continuity |
| BCP | Business Continuity Plan |
| DR | Disaster Recovery |
| RTO | Recovery Time Objective |

### **Self‑Assessment – Key Requirements for Business Continuity and Disaster Recovery Arrangements**

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| --- | --- | --- |
| Information Required | | Response |
| 2 Participant Tiering | | |
| 2.1 | Confirm your participant’s tiering | ☐Tier 1 ☐ Tier 2 |
| 2.2 | When did your participant last conduct a review to verify its tiering? | Date of the last review: Click or tap to enter a date.  The classification was updated as the result of the last review undertaken:  ☐Yes No |

This form does not reproduce the full details of each key requirement in GN10.   
Participants are expected to review the full details of each key requirement when completing the self‑assessment.

|  | KEY REQUIREMENT | LEVEL OF ALIGNMENT  Fully aligned (F)  Partially aligned (P)  Not aligned (N) | REMEDIATION  Provide details for each ‘Partially aligned’ or ‘Not aligned’ response.  Where relevant, include details of plans and timeframes to achieve a level of alignment of ‘F’ |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| 4.1 Nominated officer and core personnel | | | |
| Nominated officer: | | | |
| 4.1.1 | Appointed | F  P  N |  |
| 4.1.2 | Delegated authority | F  P  N |  |
| 4.1.3 | Requisite qualification, skills and experience | F  P  N |  |
| 4.1.4 | Aware of responsibilities under GN10 | F  P  N |  |
| 4.1.5 | Required core personnel identified | F  P  N |  |
| 4.1.6 | Ensure facilities are available for core personnel within RTO following event of disruption | F  P  N |  |
| 4.1.7 | Ensure clearly defined roles and responsibilities for core personnel under the BCP, tested as part of BCP fire drills | F  P  N |  |
| 4.1.8 | Ensure allocation matrix maintained | F  P  N |  |
| 4.1.9 | Ensure awareness training conducted for all relevant personnel | F  P  N |  |
| 4.2 Infrastructure diagrams | | | |
| 4.2.1 | Accurately reflect the current state of the technology and communication infrastructure for ASX operations | F  P  N |  |
| 4.2.2 | Identify all primary and alternate sites housing technology components, personnel and communication links between each site | F  P  N |  |
| 4.2.3 | Clearly identify elements of ASX operations at each site | F  P  N |  |
| 4.2.4 | Reflect plans for proposed material changes to technology and communication infrastructure | N/A  F  P  N |  |
| 4.3 Systems and technology records | | | |
| 4.3.1 | Proper records are retained and available for ASX upon request | F  P  N |  |
| 4.4 Replacement policy | | | |
| 4.4.1 | System and technology replacement policy developed with process to identify assets nearing end of life | F  P  N |  |
| 4.5 Business continuity plan | | | |
| 4.5.1 | Business impact analysis conducted covering a range of potential disruption scenarios specific to ASX operations | F  P  N |  |
| 4.5.2 | BCP designed to ensure that recovery and resumption of ASX operations following disruption is aligned with stated RTO | F  P  N |  |
| 4.5.3 | Signed off by nominated officer and approved by senior management body | F  P  N |  |
| 4.5.4 | Meets the “Loss of access / loss of site” scenarios   * + 1. Primary site outage with same-day recovery     2. Sustained primary site outage     3. Loss of primary electricity supply/key utilities to a primary site     4. In the event of multiple primary sites, loss of one site/connectivity between split sites     5. Major disruption to public transport / infrastructure | 1. F  P  N 2. F  P  N 3. F  P  N 4. F  P  N 5. F  P  N |  |
| 4.5.5 | Meets the “Loss of systems / technology” scenarios   1. Internal system outage 2. Primary telco provider network unavailable 3. System outage /communication failure with third party (if outsourcing) | 1. F  P  N 2. F  P  N 3. F  P  N |  |
| 4.5.6 | Meets the “Loss of staff / pandemic” scenarios | F  P  N |  |
| 4.5.7 | Meets the “Cyber” scenario | F  P  N |  |
| 4.5.8 | Securely and centrally stored and can be readily accessed (both hard and soft copies) | F  P  N |  |
| 4.6 Recovery time objective | | | |
| 4.6.1 | Tier 1:  BCP specifies RTO following initiation of BCP of no more than 2 hours for critical ASX operations | F  P  N |  |
| 4.6.2 | Tier 1:  BCP specifies RTO following initiation of BCP of no more than 4 hours for resumption of business‑as‑usual ASX operations | F  P  N |  |
| 4.6.3 | Tier 2:  BCP specifies RTO following initiation of BCP of no more than 4 hours for critical ASX operations | F  P  N |  |
| 4.6.4 | Tier 2:  BCP specifies RTO following initiation of BCP of no more than 6 hours for resumption of business‑as‑usual ASX operations | F  P  N |  |
| 4.6.5 | In cyber incidents, BCP design enables safe resumption and completion of critical ASX operations as close to applicable RTO as possible | F  P  N |  |
| 4.6.6 | Framework to ensure decision making process is timely following a disruption | F  P  N |  |
| 4.7 System resilience | | | |
| 4.7.1 | Technology is configured and plans and processes established to allow ASX operations to be recovered and resumed at an alternate site with minimal downtime and within the RTO | F  P  N |  |
| 4.7.2 | Sufficient technology to enable ASX operations to occur at each location, independently | F  P  N |  |
| 4.7.3 | Alternate site can handle business‑as‑usual volumes and any additional volume associated with the disruption | F  P  N |  |
| 4.7.4 | Technology at all sites is secured and adequately protected | F  P  N |  |
| 4.7.5 | Sites have a continuous power supply and generator back-up for a reasonable period | F  P  N |  |
| 4.7.6 | Sites have separate hardware and communication lines to avoid single points of failure | F  P  N |  |
| 4.7.7 | Sites are on common software versions with access to appropriate system and software documentation as required | F  P  N |  |
| 4.7.8 | Suitable test environment readily available at primary and alternate sites | F  P  N |  |
| 4.7.9 | Error-message logs available at primary and alternate sites | F  P  N |  |
| 4.7.10 | If data centres operate in an ‘active-active’ configuration, appropriate monitoring tools are readily available | N/A  F  P  N |  |
| 4.7.11 | If using a shared facility, appropriate arrangements to preserve the confidentiality of client information | N/A  F  P  N |  |
| 4.7.12 | System resilience maintained across and between all sites to continue business as usual activity in the event of a disruption or loss of connectivity to one or more site | F  P  N |  |
| 4.7.13 | Consideration given to implementing dual communication lines or internet service providers | F  P  N |  |
| 4.7.14 | Regular reviews to improve cyber resilience | F  P  N |  |
| 4.7.15 | Arrangements at all sites aligned to relevant global or national cyber standards and guidance | F  P  N |  |
| 4.7.16 | Tier 1:  Alternate sites are geographically remote | N/A  F  P  N |  |
| 4.8 Connectivity requirements | | | |
| 4.8.1 | Technical requirements are met for the relevant ASX facilities  ASX Clear, ASX Clear (Futures) and ASX Settlement   1. Connections in name of participant or Related Body Corporate 2. Connections used exclusively for participant’s ASX activities 3. Clearing gateways with direct connectivity to the facility located within Australia (where applicable)   ASX Settlement only:   1. As approved by ASX | 1. F  P  N 2. F  P  N 3. F  P  N      1. F  P  N |  |
| 4.8.2 | If using a ‘shared’ data centre ability to evidence there are no common or single points of failure | F  P  N |  |
| 4.9 Data recovery | | | |
| 4.9.1 | Plans and processes in place and technology configured to minimise loss of data relevant to ASX operations | F  P  N |  |
| 4.9.2 | Maintenance and storage of back-up end‑of‑day production data for an appropriate period | F  P  N |  |
| 4.9.3 | Capture and storage of start-of-day snapshot of production data for an appropriate period | N/A  F  P  N |  |
| 4.9.4 | Ability to identify the status of clearing and/or settlement messages and/or open positions at the time of disruption | F  P  N |  |
| 4.9.5 | Ability to identify any outstanding clearing and/or transactions and payments for both house and client accounts (as applicable) at the time of recovery of ASX operations | F  P  N |  |
| 4.9.6 | Tier 1 & all running in ‘active-active’ mode or ‘real-time’ replications across multiple sites:  Capture and storage of multiple intra-day snapshots of production data | N/A  F  P  N |  |
| 4.10 Incident management plan | | | |
| 4.10.1 | Clearly defined and documented incident management plans addressing disruption scenarios identified | F  P  N |  |
| 4.10.2 | Clear communications plan applicable for each disruption scenario with up‑to‑date contact list for key parties | F  P  N |  |
| 4.10.3 | Reviewed and tested at least annually | F  P  N |  |
| 4.10.4 | Available in electronic and hard copies, and accessible at all primary and alternate sites | F  P  N |  |
| 4.11 Incident management records | | | |
| 4.11.1 | Proper records of disruptions impacting ASX operations are maintained | F  P  N |  |
| 4.12 BCP testing | | | |
| 4.12.1 | Testing is conducted at least once annually | F  P  N |  |
| 4.12.2 | Testing is conducted as soon as practicable following any material change | F  P  N |  |
| 4.12.3 | Testing is conducted as soon as practicable following notification by ASX | F  P  N |  |
| 4.12.4 | The BCP testing confirms the scenarios listed including (at a minimum):   1. Technology fail-over from primary to alternate site 2. Comms network fail-over to alternate site 3. Validation of connectivity, data and applications at alternate sites 4. Confirmed user access to technology and applications at alternate sites (including remote access) 5. Business-as-usual processes completed at alternate sites 6. Sufficient capacity to handle business-as-usual and additional volumes accumulated 7. Successful restoration of the production environment | 1. F  P  N 2. F  P  N 3. F  P  N 4. F  P  N 5. F  P  N 6. F  P  N 7. F  P  N |  |
| 4.12.5 | Outcomes of testing recorded and analysed, specifically including confirmation that the RTO was met | F  P  N |  |
| 4.12.6 | The final test outcomes, including any enhancements to the test plan, are signed off by the nominated officer and properly reported | F  P  N |  |
| 4.13 Outsourced or offshored operations | | | |
| 4.13.1 | ASX related activities have been outsourced or offshored | Yes [proceed to 4.13.2]  No [proceed to section 4.14] |  |
| 4.13.2 | Has appropriate resources and processes to develop its BCP with due consideration to the dependencies on any third party performing outsourced or offshored activities | F  P  N |  |
| 4.13.3 | Has appropriate resources and processes to ensure service level agreements require a third party to have and maintain appropriate and complementary BC arrangements that allow the participant’s RTO to be met | F  P  N |  |
| 4.13.4 | Has appropriate resources and processes to supervise any outsourced or offshored activities | F  P  N |  |
| 4.13.5 | Has appropriate resources and processes to track, approve and independently assess all infrastructure changes undertaken by a third party to determine if updates are required to its BCP arrangements | F  P  N |  |
| 4.14 Change management | | | |
| 4.14.1 | Change management policies and procedures designed effectively to ensure that changes to ASX operations are assessed, tested, authorised and appropriate DR arrangements are in place prior to implementation | F  P  N |  |
| 4.14.2 | Framework in place to identify material and relevant changes made by vendors or service providers impacting ASX Operations, and to ensure these are subject to change management policies and procedures | F  P  N |  |
| 4.14.3 | Independent assessment of changes made and testing conducted by vendors or service providers | F  P  N |  |
| 4.15 Notification requirements | | | |
| 4.15.1 | BCP includes notification requirements to ASX of relevant disruptions and outages | F  P  N |  |
| 4.15.2 | Policies and procedures incorporate compliance notification obligations | F  P  N |  |
| 4.16 Independent review | | | |
| 4.16.1 | DR and BC arrangements are independently reviewed on a periodic basis | F  P  N |  |

1. GN10 was published on 5 August 2019 for ASX Clear, ASX Clear (Futures), ASX Settlement and Austraclear [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. Transition arrangements for implementing the target RTO are outlined in the report *Results of Consultation on Guidance Note changes for ASX Clear, ASX Settlement, ASX Clear (Futures) and Austraclear participants*, published on 5 August 2019 and available on [asx.com.au](https://www.asx.com.au/regulation/public-consultations.htm) [↑](#footnote-ref-2)